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This article analyzes whether statements in a document
properly authenticated as "ancient" pursuant to Federal Rule
of Evidence 901(b)(8) are subject to the rule against multiple
hearsay. I conclude that the rule against multiple hearsay
applies to such statements in ancient documents. In order
for a given statement in an ancient document to be admissi-
ble to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the statement
must either be within the personal knowledge of the author
or qualify under a separate exception to the hearsay rule.
For each level of hearsay present within the document, the
party offering the hearsay evidence must demonstrate that
an exception to the hearsay rule applies.
Federal Rule of Evidence 802 provides that "[h]earsay' is
not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority or by Act of Congress."2 Rule 803 sets out a num-
ber of exceptions to this rule, including the following: "(16)
[s]tatements in ancient documents" and "[s]tatements in a
document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity
of which is established."3 Authenticating a document as "an-
cient" is accomplished by satisfying the straightforward
* The author received his J.D. from Yale Law School and is a member of
the California bar.
1. "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c). "A 'statement' is (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an as-
sertion." FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
2. FED. R. EVID. 802.
3. FED. R. EVID. 803(16).
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standards of Rule 901, including 901(b)(8)."' The legal ques-
tion is thus presented: does authenticating a document as
"ancient" mean that every statement contained in it is auto-
matically excepted from the hearsay rule by operation of Rule
803(16)?
Rooted in Rule 805 is a general rule against hearsay
within hearsay.' "Hearsay within hearsay, or multiple hear-
say, occurs when a witness, W, attempts to testify that A told
W what B said."' Multiple hearsay is "wholly inadmissible
when any single out-of-court statement fails to qualify under
an exclusion from or exception to the hearsay rule. In other
words, the testimony is inadmissible if A's statement is ad-
missible but B's is not or if B's statement is admissible but
A's is not."7
4. Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) states: "The requirement of authentica-
tion or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims." FED. R. EVID. 901(a). One of the "examples of authentica-
tion or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule" is found in
subpart (b)(8) of Rule 901:
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a docu-
ment or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as
to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a
place where, if authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in exis-
tence 20 years or more at the time it is offered.
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8).
5. "Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay
rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the
hearsay rule provided in these rules." FED. R. EVID. 805.
6. 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE, § 805.04, at 805-6 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d
ed. 1998).
7. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 998 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that second level of hearsay was excluded because there was no
indication that the document preparer "was a percipient witness to the facts set
forth therein, or that he recorded information transmitted to him by a person
with first hand knowledge"); Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 F.2d 901, 907-08
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that while police report was by itself admissible, state-
ment within the police report was hearsay not falling within any exception, and
was therefore inadmissible); United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938,
942-43 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding coast guard officer's report inadmissible be-
cause it contained multiple levels of hearsay, not all of which were admissible);
United States v. Dotson, 821 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding police re-
port containing statement by police sergeant relating admission by defendant's
agent inadmissible, even though admission itself was within hearsay exception,
because statement by sergeant was hearsay not within any exception); United
States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 976-77 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that FBI agent's
report was by itself admissible, but statement in report repeating the out of
court statements of others was hearsay not subject to any exception).
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Courts confronted with this issue have used divergent
and conflicting methods of analysis. Some decisions have
held that statements within documents authenticated as an-
cient are subject to the rules against multiple hearsay.8 A
number of these cases have, as a result, held certain state-
ments in ancient documents inadmissible.9 Other decisions,
however, have admitted statements in ancient documents
without considering the multiple layers of hearsay present."
Thus, statements that would otherwise constitute multiple
hearsay have been admitted to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."
Some commentators have explored the issue of multiple
hearsay in ancient documents in the context of the common
law. 2 None, however, have comprehensively analyzed the is-
sue with respect to the version of the rule codified in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. 3 The few commentators that have
touched on the issue suggest or imply, without thorough
analysis, that some "showing" that the drafter of the ancient
document had personal knowledge of matters stated in the
document "may be required."4 Precisely what level of proof
8. See United States v. Hajda, 135 F.3d 439, 444 (7th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Stelmokas, No. 92-3440, 1995 WL 464264, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2,
1995); Estate of Cole v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 715, 722-23 (T.C. Nov.
20, 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Rhode Is-
land Asbestos Cases, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (CBC) 444, 447-48 (D.R.I. 1982).
9. See United States v. Stelmokas, No. 92-3440, 1995 WL 464264, at *5-6
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 1995); Estate of Cole v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 715,
722-23 (T.C. Nov. 20, 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.
1992); In re Rhode Island Asbestos Cases, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (CBC) 444,
447-48 (D.R.I. 1982).
10. See, e.g., Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County, 800 F. Supp. 676,
681 (N.D. Ind. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993); Co-
lumbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Sailing Vessel, 742 F. Supp. 1327,
1343 (E.D. Va. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 974 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1992); Ful-
mer v. Connors, 665 F. Supp. 1472, 1490 (N.D. Ala. 1987); Ammons v. Dade
City, Fla., 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1280 n.8 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
11. See cases cited supra note 10.
12. See Joseph A. Wickes, Ancient Documents and Hearsay, 8 TEX. L. REV.
451 (1930); Comment, Ancient Documents as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule,
33 YALE L.J. 412 (1924); Note, Recitals in Ancient Documents, 46 IOWA L. REV.
448 (1961). See also JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 323, at 537
(4th ed. 1992) (stating, without thorough analysis, that "the writing [in the an-
cient document] is inadmissible if the declarant lacked the opportunity for
firsthand observation of the facts asserted").
13. See sources cited supra note 12.
14. See STRONG, supra note 12, § 323, at 537; CHARLES E. WAGNER,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE CASE LAW COMMENTARY 548 (1994) ("[An
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constitutes a satisfactory "showing" of personal knowledge is
not explained. 5 For example, is it necessary to prove by ad-
missible evidence other than the ancient document that the
author had personal knowledge, or is it enough that this fact
may be inferred from the ancient document itself? Nor does
any article explain what happens if this showing is not
made. 6 And most significantly, no article discusses the ap-
plication of the rule against multiple hearsay to statements
within ancient documents."
A review of the case law and statements by commenta-
tors identified above may lead one to conclude that, when de-
termining the admissibility of statements in ancient docu-
ments, one must choose between two competing approaches.
Each of these two approaches is equally extreme. Restated
succinctly, one approach implied by a number of decisions, is
that all statements in ancient documents are admissible, no
matter how many levels of hearsay are involved. 8 The other
approach, implied by a number of commentators, is that
statements in ancient documents are admissible only if they
are within the personal knowledge of the author. 9 If they are
not within the personal knowledge of the author the state-
ments are excluded, regardless of whether such statements
might otherwise fall under another exception to the rule
against multiple hearsay." Neither of these two extreme ap-
proaches is satisfactory from a policy perspective. As will be
demonstrated below, an analysis of the text, legislative his-
tory, and common law origin of the ancient document rule all
demonstrate that the admissibility of statements in ancient
authenticated ancient] document is reliable if the drafter had firsthand knowl-
edge of the events to which the document relates."); 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 6, § 803.21[3], at 803-114 to 115 ("[A] showing from the circum-
stances that declarant could have had the requisite knowledge may be re-
quired.").
15. See sources cited supra note 14.
16. See sources cited supra note 14.
17. See sources cited supra note 14.
18. See, e.g., Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County, 800 F. Supp. 676,
681 (N.D. Ind. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993); Co-
lumbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Sailing Vessel, 742 F. Supp. 1327,
1343 (E.D. Va. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 974 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1992); Ful-
mer v. Connors, 665 F. Supp. 1472, 1490 (N.D. Ala 1987); Ammons v. Dade
City, 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1280 n.8 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
19. See STRONG, supra note 12, § 323, at 537; WAGNER, supra note 14, at
548; 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 6, § 803.21[3], at 803-114 to 115.
20. See sources cited supra note 19.
722 [Vol. 39
ANCIENT DOCUMENTS
documents should be resolved by a third approach.
The legal question presented in this article is not simply
theoretical. "The phenomenon of docket delays as well as the
frequent litigation of liability arising from health detriments
that may take decades to come about may be giving new life
to the neglected 'ancient documents' hearsay exception."
21
This is particularly true under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), which makes liable, among others, anyone who
deposited hazardous materials at a place covered by the stat-
ute.22 The statute of limitations for a cost recovery action un-
der CERCLA runs from the date the plaintiff performed cer-
tain acts to clean up the contamination. 23 Because this date
may be many decades after the materials were deposited, the
plaintiff may try to use "ancient" documents to prove that the
materials were deposited by a particular defendant.24
The availability of potentially "ancient" documents is
also greater than ever before. Advances in computer technol-
ogy have dramatically increased the amount of information
that can be stored in a given amount of space.2'5 These same
advances have also substantially eased the burden of
searching, retrieving, and organizing information. Attempts
to use ancient documents, along with the concomitant dis-
putes over admissibility, are likely to become much more fre-
quent. 2' Therefore, courts must be clear as to the application
21. Rule 803(16): Ancient Documents, 15 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
NEWS 90-177, 90-189 (1990).
22. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1995).
23. CERCLA § 113(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (1995) ("An initial action for
recovery of the costs referred to in § 9607 of this title must be com-
menced... for a removal action, within three years after completion of the re-
moval action[; ... for a remedial action, within six years after initiation of
physical on-site construction of the remedial action.").
24. Cf. Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116, 1130 n.15
(N.D. Fla. 1995) (offering ancient documents to counter affirmative defense to
CERCLA liability); Catellus Dev. Corp. v. L.D. McFarland Co., 23 ENVTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21487, 21492-93 (D. Or. July 27, 1993) (premising claim of
CERCLA liability on newspaper article offered as ancient document).
25. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) advisory committee's note ("The familiar an-
cient document rule of the common law is extended to include data stored elec-
tronically or by other similar means .... This expansion is necessary in view of
the widespread use of methods of storing data in forms other than conventional
written records.").
26. See G. Michael Fenner, Law Professor Reveals Shocking Truth About
Hearsay, 62 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1, 30 (1993) ("[The ancient document exception to
the hearsay rule] will be applied more frequently and more frequently it will be
7231999]
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of the rules relating to multiple hearsay within ancient
documents. This article analyzes this issue and concludes
that the rules relating to multiple hearsay apply to state-
ments within an authenticated "ancient document."
II. THE LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE ARE AMBIGUOUS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT
STATEMENTS IN ANCIENT DOCUMENTS MAY BE EXCLUDED AS
HEARSAY
Although the approach has been criticized by some com-
mentators,27 the United States Supreme Court has made
clear that the Federal Rules of Evidence are to be interpreted
as one would interpret any statute." Familiar canons of
statutory interpretation require that legal analysis begin
with the language of the statute.29 The general rule is that a
statute should be interpreted according to its clear and plain
meaning." The statute's legislative history may be consid-
ered only when the statute is unclear or when a literal con-
struction would lead to an absurd result.3' However, some
decisions have examined legislative history even in the ab-
sence of these conditions.32
The language and structure of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence are unclear as to whether statements in authentic an-
applied to prove essential elements of the case.").
27. See, e.g., Glen Weissenberger, Are the Federal Rules of Evidence a Stat-
ute?, 55 OHIO ST. L. J. 393 (1994); Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and
the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L. J. 1307
(1992).
28. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (stating
that the Supreme Court will "interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules
of Evidence as [the Court] would any statute"). See also Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,
687 (1988); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987); Edward R.
Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-
The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Commit-
tee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 (1992); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of
the Supreme Court's Approach to the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 27 IND. L. REV. 267 (1993); Randolf N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court,
Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745 (1990).
29. See Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 981 F.2d
429, 433 (9th Cir. 1992).
30. See id.
31. See id.; Sullivan v. C.I.A., 992 F.2d 1249, 1252 (1st Cir. 1993); United
States v. Sheek, 990 F.2d 150, 152-53 (4th Cir. 1993).
32. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993)
(examining legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
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cient documents are subject to the rules against hearsay-in-
cluding multiple hearsay. Based on the text of the Rules of
Evidence and the plain language of Rule 803(16), a compel-
ling argument can be made that statements in ancient docu-
ments are not subject to the rule against multiple hearsay."
Rule 803(16) is not limited to non-hearsay statements or
statements about which the author has personal knowledge.
Because Rule 803(16) does not contain additional qualifica-
tions, it suggests that all statements in ancient documents
are admissible for the truth of the matters asserted, regard-
less of the number of levels of hearsay present.
However, consider Rule 805."' The "plain" language of
Rule 803(16) is inconsistent with Rule 805, which operates to
exclude multiple hearsay unless each level of hearsay quali-
fies under an exception. Nonetheless, it is a familiar cannon
of statutory interpretation that, "however inclusive may be
the general language of a statute, it will not be held to apply
to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same
enactment. Specific terms prevail over the general in the
same or another statute which otherwise might be control-
ling.""5 It can be argued that Rule 805's exclusion of double
hearsay is a rule of general applicability that cannot be in-
terpreted to apply to statements in ancient documents. The
admissibility of such statements would be specifically ad-
dressed by Rule 803(16)."6
The argument that statements in authenticated ancient
documents are not subject to the rule against multiple hear-
say is further supported by comparing it with other hearsay
exceptions. The language of other exceptions to the hearsay
rule that pertain to documents demonstrates that the draft-
ers knew how to restrict hearsay exceptions to only one or
two levels of hearsay. When they wanted to restrict them in
33. See FED. R. EVID. 803, 803(16). The full text of the ancient document
exception to the hearsay rule is as follows: "(16) Statements in ancient docu-
ments. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or more the
authenticity of which is established." Id.
34. "Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay
rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the
hearsay rule provided in these rules." FED. R. EVID. 805.
35. Maiatico v. United States, 302 F.2d 880, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (internal
quotation marks omitted). See also In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1986).
36. See supra text accompanying note 33.
7251999]
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this way, the drafters expressly stated the restriction in the
language of the particular exception. For example, Rule
803(6)'s exception for "[r]ecords of regularly conducted activ-
ity"37 specifically addresses the issue of multiple hearsay. In
order for a statement to be excepted from the hearsay rule
under Rule 803(6), it must be shown, among other things,
that the statement was "made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge."38
Stated another way, the statements in the document are not
hearsay if the author has personal knowledge or received the
information from someone with personal knowledge.39  The
number of levels of hearsay excepted by Rule 803(6) is two,
and no more. ° If the author received the information from
someone without personal knowledge, for example, if W
wrote what A told W about what B said to A, then it does not
qualify under Rule 803(6) as an exception to the hearsay rule.
This point is also illustrated by examining the language
of the "recorded recollection" hearsay exception at Rule
803(5)."' This rule provides that a "memorandum or record
37. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). This rule provides:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memo-
randum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testi-
mony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate
lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and
calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., United States v. David, 96 F.3d 1477, 1481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(stating that a record under Rule 803(6) may be admitted to show truth of the
statement made to author of record if the author verified information provided
to him by declarant).
40. The statements of the author constitute one level of hearsay, while the
statements of the person with knowledge who transmitted the information to
the author constitute a second level of hearsay.
41. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5). This rule states:
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness
once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the
witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness'
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the
memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be
received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
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concerning a matter" is not hearsay only if, among other
things, the matter is something about which the "witness
once had knowledge" and the memorandum or record was
"made or adopted by the witness."42 In other words, only if
the memorandum or record was created by someone with
personal knowledge of the matters stated can the document
be excepted from the hearsay rule. Rule 803(5) excepts just
one level of hearsay. If the witness who created the memo-
randum or record lacks personal knowledge, for example, W
attempts to repeat what A told W, then Rule 803(5)'s excep-
tion to the hearsay rule does not apply.
In contrast, a number of other hearsay exceptions do not
limit the number of levels of hearsay that are excluded from
the rule against hearsay. Subsections (13), (19), (20), and
(21) of Rule 803 except statements of "personal or family his-
tory" contained in "family records,"43 "reputation concerning
personal or family history,"44 "reputation concerning bounda-
ries or general history," 5 and "reputation as to character."46
None of these exceptions identifies any limit on the number
of levels of hearsay that are excepted from the rule. State-
ments of this type routinely involve multiple hearsay, since
the underlying information is rarely within the personal
knowledge of the declarant.
Consistent with this, a number of courts have held that
42. Id.
43. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(13) excepts from the hearsay rule: "Fam-
ily records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained
in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family
portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like." FED. R. EVID.
803(13).
44. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(19) excepts from the rule against hearsay:
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation
among members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or mar-
riage, or among a person's associates, or in the community, con-
cerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, le-
gitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or
other similar fact of his personal or family history.
FED. R. EVID. 803(19).
45. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(20) excepts from the hearsay rule: "Repu-
tation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community,
arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in
the community, and reputation as to events of general history important to the
community or State or nation in which located." FED. R. EVID. 803(20).
46. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(21) excepts from the rule against hearsay:
"Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among associ-
ates or in the community." FED. R. EVID. 803(21).
1999] 727
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statements coming within these exceptions were admissible,
without first determining whether the declarant had per-
sonal knowledge of the matters stated. For example, in
United States v. Duke,47 the court stated that "[t]he defendant
may introduce evidence of his reputation ("character"), and
such a witness not only may but must base his testimony upon
hearsay, in effect summarizing what he has heard in the
community.4 8  In Walley v. United,49 the court explained the
rationale for the hearsay exception for reputation of bounda-
ries in a way that strongly suggests that the rule against
multiple hearsay has no application:
Of course, this parol testimony was hearsay, since most of
the witnesses did not know these facts personally, but the
plaintiffs say that this evidence is admissible as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. We agree. The reason for this
rule is not only caused by the perishable nature of bound-
ary markers, but also because general reputation about
facts of community interest are generally trustworthy. It
is unlikely that a falsehood could become generally ac-
cepted in the community as the truth. The prolonged and
constant exposure of these facts to observation and discus-
sion by the community sifts out the possible errors and
gives to the residual facts which are generally accepted by
the locality a trustworthiness which allows these facts to
47. 492 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1974).
48. Id. at 695 (emphasis added). Cf 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note
6, § 803.24[2], at 803-124 ("Repute in the community has always been allowed
to show evidence of marriage, and some courts extend this to prove other as-
pects of family history.") (citations omitted). While there are some limitations
on who can testify as to reputation concerning family pedigree, personal knowl-
edge is clearly not required. For example, in Young Ah Chor v. Dulles, 270 F.2d
338 (9th Cir. 1959), the court stated the following about laying a foundation for
testimony about reputation:
As a general rule proof of such reputation and tradition should be lim-
ited to reputation and tradition in the family, the genealogy of which is
under inquiry. The testimony of the witness in the instant case did not
purport to be based upon the reputation and tradition in the Young
Yick family, the genealogy of which was under inquiry. While we rec-
ognize, as stated in the last cited case, that under exceptional circum-
stances testimony relating to pedigree and family tradition based upon
neighbor or community reputation has been held to be admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule, the testimonial foundation for the appli-
cation of such rule is completely lacking in this case.
270 F.2d at 345 (internal citations omitted).
49. 148 Ct. Cl. 371, 373-74 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
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be presented as evidence in a court of law. °
Just like these exceptions, the ancient document rule at
Rule 803(16) contains no express limitation on the number of
levels of hearsay excepted from the rule against hearsay.
This suggests that, just as the rule against multiple hearsay
appears not to apply to the exceptions for "family history"
and "reputation," it does not apply to the ancient document
rule.
This conclusion is further reinforced by the language of
the exceptions contained in subsections (5) and (6) to Rule
803. These exceptions expressly limit the number of levels of
hearsay excepted from the rule against hearsay. The omis-
sion of a similar limitation in the ancient document rule at
Rule 803(16) and in the "family history" and "reputation" ex-
ceptions appears to have been deliberate. It can be argued
that this reflects the intention of the drafters that all state-
ments in authenticated ancient documents, regardless of how
many levels of hearsay they contain, would be admissible to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
There is, on the other hand, ample basis in the language
and structure of the Rules of Evidence to conclude that
statements in ancient documents are subject to the rule
against multiple hearsay. First, the language of Rule 803 it-
self, as informed by Rule 602, supports this proposition.5'
The ancient document rule is one of twenty-four hearsay ex-
ceptions listed in Rule 803.52 In its preface to this list of ex-
ceptions, Rule 803 states: "The following are not excluded by
the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness."53 Thus, for each of the hearsay exceptions identified
in Rule 803, Rule 803 presumes the existence of a "declar-
ant"-a witness who, although he or she will not actually tes-
tify, could testify about the out-of-court statement. 54 Not eve-
ryone is allowed to testify as a witness. Rule 602 provides
that one may not testify as a witness unless he or she has
personal knowledge of the matters about which he or she tes-
tifies.5 Because it assumes the existence of a competent wit-
50. Id. at 373-74.
51. See FED. R. EVID. 601, 602.
52. FED. R. EVID. 803.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. "A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced suf-
7291999]
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ness, Rule 803 implicitly requires that in order for a state-
ment to be admissible under any of the listed exceptions, the
statement must have been made by someone with personal
knowledge. Applying this requirement to the exception at is-
sue here, a statement in an ancient document is not excepted
from the rule against hearsay unless the person making the
statement, that is, the author, had personal knowledge of the
matter stated.
This interpretation is also supported by Rule 805. A
statute should not be interpreted to render any part of it su-
perfluous." When confronted with arguably inconsistent
statutory provisions, the court should reconcile them in order
to give effect to both.57 Rule 805 provides: "[h]earsay included
within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each
part of the combined statement conforms with an exception
to the hearsay rule provided in these rules."58  Rule 805's
prohibition against multiple hearsay can apply, if at all, only
in conjunction with the various exceptions to the hearsay
rule. Without exceptions to the hearsay rule, there is no need
for a rule concerning multiple hearsay at all. The logic that
suggests the rule against multiple hearsay does not apply to
statements in ancient documents would also suggest the rule
against multiple hearsay does not apply to any of the other
exceptions to the hearsay rule as well. None of the other ex-
ceptions expressly refers to the rule against multiple hear-
say. Nevertheless, the multiple hearsay rule has been held to
apply to some of these other hearsay exceptions.59 Therefore,
ficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the mat-
ter." FED. R. EVID. 602.
56. See Smith v. Babcock, 19 F.3d 257, 263 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that
courts should avoid statutory interpretations that create internal inconsisten-
cies or render a portion of the statute superfluous).
57. See In re Colonial Realty Co., 980 F.2d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 1992) (explain-
ing that a statute must be read so that two arguably inconsistent provisions of
a statute are both given effect where possible); United States v. Gordon, 961
F.2d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Courts should attempt to reconcile two seemingly
conflicting statutory provisions whenever possible, instead of allowing one pro-
vision effectively to nullify the other provision").
58. FED. R. EVID. 805.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 997-98 (9th Cir.
1991) (concluding that statements in documents otherwise falling within hear-
say exceptions at Rule 803(6) and 803(8) are excluded because there was no in-
dication that the preparer of the document "was a percipient witness to the
facts set forth therein, or that he recorded information transmitted to him by a
person with first hand knowledge"); Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 F.2d 901,
907-08 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that while police report was by itself admissible
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statements in authenticated ancient documents must be
subject to the rules against multiple hearsay. An interpreta-
tion to the contrary would read Rule 805 out of existence.
If the "reputation" exceptions from the hearsay rule are
not subject to the rule against multiple hearsay, this does not
mean that statements in ancient documents must also be free
from its constraints. Distinctions can be made between the
two types of exceptions. Each of the exceptions at subsec-
tions (19), (20), and (21) is framed in terms of "reputation,"
rather than, for example, "statements."" Unlike a statement,
reputation is something that exists among a group of people.
The reputation exceptions define these groups as "members
of [a] family,"6 "a community,"" or "associates. "63 Application
of the rule against multiple hearsay to "reputation" is mean-
ingless, since reputation by its very nature consists solely of
multiple hearsay. In contrast to "reputation," a "statement"
is an assertion that can be made by any number of persons,
including just one. Even if the rule against multiple hearsay
cannot apply to the "reputation" exceptions, it can still be
logically applied to "statements." This includes statements in
business records and public records, which have been held to
be subject to the rule against multiple hearsay.64 Therefore,
it should also include "statements in ancient documents." 5
Compelling arguments can be made both for and against
the proposition that statements in ancient documents are
subject to the rule against multiple hearsay when basing the
arguments on the language of the rules. Because of this am-
pursuant to Rule 803(8), statement within the police report was hearsay not
falling within any exception, and was therefore inadmissible); United States v.
Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 942-43 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the
coast guard officer's report was inadmissible under Rule 805 because it con-
tained hearsay within hearsay, and no exception applied); United States v. Dot-
son, 821 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that the police report contain-
ing a statement by the police sergeant relating the admission by defendant's
agent inadmissible under Rule 805 even though the admission itself was non-
hearsay, because statement by sergeant was hearsay not within any exception);
United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 976-77 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that the
FBI agent's report was by itself admissible under Rule 803(8), but the state-
ment in the report repeating the out of court statements of others was hearsay
not subject to any exception).
60. FED. R. EVID. 803(19), (20), (21).
61. FED. R. EVID. 803(19).
62. FED. R. EVID. 803(20).
63. FED. R. EVID. 803(21).
64. See cases cited supra note 59.
65. FED. R. EVID. 803(16).
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biguity, it is necessary and appropriate to examine the legis-
lative history and common law predecessor to Rule 803(16).
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 803(16) CONFIRMS THAT STATEMENTS WITHIN
DOCUMENTS AUTHENTICATED AS ANCIENT ARE SUBJECT TO
THE RULES AGAINST MULTIPLE HEARSAY
The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1975, specifi-
cally address the treatment of ancient documents in two
separate rules, 803(16) and 901(b)(8). The Advisory Commit-
tee notes on Rule 90166 confirm that this rule is an extension
of the common law rule concerning ancient documents and
explain some of the elements of authentication of ancient
documents.67 The treatment of multiple hearsay within an-
cient documents under the common law is discussed in Part
IV below. The notes to Rule 901 do not otherwise provide any
guidance as to application of the rule against multiple hear-
say to statements within ancient documents.
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(16) discusses
the relationship between the rules against hearsay and an-
cient documents. 68  The discussion, however, is less than
66. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1939, 1943; Act of Dec.
12, 1975, Pub. L. 94-149, § 1(11), 89 Stat. 805.
67. See FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee's notes. The notes state:
The familiar ancient document rule of the common law is extended to
include data stored electronically or by other similar means. Since the
importance of appearance diminishes in this situation, the importance
of custody or place where found increases correspondingly. This ex-
pansion is necessary in view of the widespread use of methods of stor-
ing data in forms other than conventional written records.
Id.
68. The Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules for Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(16) provide:
Authenticating a document as ancient, essentially in the pattern of
common law, as provided in Rule 901(b)(8), leaves open as a separate
question the admissibility of assertive statements contained therein as
against a hearsay objection. 7 WIGMORE § 2145a. Wigmore further
states that the ancient document technique of authentication is uni-
versally conceded to apply to all sorts of documents, including letters,
records, contracts, maps, and certificate, in addition to tile documents,
citing numerous decisions. Id. § 145. Since most of these items are
significant evidentially only insofar as they are assertive, their admis-
sion in evidence must be as a hearsay exception. But see 5 id. § 1573,
at 429, referring to recitals in ancient deeds as a "limited" hearsay ex-
ception. The former position is believed to be the correct one in reason
and authority. As pointed out in MCCORMICK § 298, danger of mistake
is minimized by authentication requirements, and age affords assur-
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clear. The Note begins by citing Wigmore on Evidence:
"[a]uthenticating a document as ancient, essentially in the
pattern of the common law, as provided in Rule 901(b)(8),
leaves open as a separate question the admissibility of asser-
tive statements contained therein as against a hearsay objec-
tion." 9 After further citing Wigmore for the proposition that
all types of documents may be authenticated as ancient, the
Note to Rule 803(16) continues:
Since most of these items are significant evidentially only
insofar as they are assertive, their admission in evidence
must be as a hearsay exception. [However, in section 1573
Wigmore] refer[s] to recitals in ancient deeds as a limited
hearsay exception. The former position is believed to be
the correct one in reason and authority. °
Wigmore on Evidence draws a distinction between
authenticating a document as ancient and having statements
within that document be admitted into evidence.7 ' "The pres-
ent principle [concerning ancient documents] deals only with
the authentication of the document. Whether the contents
are material, or whether any statements of assertion con-
tained in them are admissible for any purpose, should depend
on different principles."72  This is the same distinction en-
dorsed by the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(16).
Wigmore also, however, draws a distinction between the ad-
missibility of statements in authenticated ancient deeds and
the admissibility of statements in other types of authenti-
cated ancient documents. While there is a hearsay exception
for statements in ancient deeds, there is no hearsay exception
for statements in other types of ancient documents.73 "Such
statements may or may not be admissible under some excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, and their admissibility must of
ance that the writing antedates the present controversy. See Dallas
County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961), upholding [the] admissibility of 58-year-old newspaper story.
Cf. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 364 (1962), but see id. 254.
FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee's note.
69. FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee's note (citing 7 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2145a, at 744 (James H. Chadbourn ed.,
1978)).
70. Id.
71. 7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2145a, at 744 (James
H. Chadbourn ed., 1978).
72. Id.
73. Compare id., with 5 id. § 1573, at 520.
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course depend upon the appropriate principle."74 This is the
distinction that the Note to Rule 803(16) rejects when it
states that, "[slince most of these items are significant evi-
dentially only insofar as they are assertive, their admission
in evidence must be as a hearsay exception."75
The Note to Rule 803(16) goes on to state the rationale
for creating a hearsay exception for statements in all ancient
documents: "[als pointed out in McCormick section 298, dan-
ger of mistake is minimized by authentication requirements,
and age affords assurance that the writing antedates the pre-
sent controversy."76 Thus, ancient documents are an excep-
tion to the federal hearsay rule for two reasons: (1) the mini-
mization of the risk of "mistake" and (2) the document's
"age." What is the impact of these twin rationales for pur-
poses of determining whether statements in authenticated
ancient documents are subject to the rule against multiple
hearsay?
The Note to Rule 803(16) refers to the minimization of
mistake in terms of "authentication requirements," with a ci-
tation to section 298 of McCormick, addressing "Recitals in
Ancient Writings."77 McCormick acknowledges that under
the common law, statements in documents authenticated as
ancient have frequently been held to be exceptions to the rule
against hearsay." He goes on to recount the arguments ad-
vanced by the supporters of the rule, including that "the dan-
ger of fabrication, or mistransmission, so apparent in all
cases of oral declarations, are here reduced to a minimum by
the requirements for authentication. 7 9 Whose authentication
requirements are referred to and what are their require-
ments? There is no material difference in the authentication
requirements of the common law from the federal rules ex-
cept for how old a document must be in order to be authenti-
74. 7 id. § 2145a, at 744 (citations omitted).
75. Fed. R. Evid. 803(16) advisory committee's note.
76. FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee's note (citing Dallas County v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961) which upheld
the admissibility of a 58-year-old newspaper story).
77. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 298,
at 623 (1st ed. 1954).
78. Id. "American courts have frequently held, as if it were merely an ap-
plication of the rule about authentication, that the statements in an ancient





cated as ancient. Under common law, "[tlhe requirements for
authentication are that the writing must be shown to be
thirty years old, and to have come from proper custody, and it
must be free from suspicion in appearance."8" A document is
authenticated under the federal rules if there is "evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims."8' One of the "examples of
authentication or identification conforming with the re-
quirements of this rule" is found in subpart (b)(8) of Rule 901,
which deals specifically with ancient documents. It states:
Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a
document or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such
condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authen-
ticity, (B) was in a place where, if authentic, would likely
be, and (C) has been in existence [twenty] years or more at
the time it is offered.82
Ignoring the age requirement, which will be dealt with
separately below, authentication rules of neither the common
law nor the federal rules minimize the risk of "mistake" in an
ancient document as opposed to any other type of document.
When the author of a document, W, attempts to write down
what A told him, the risk that W will mistranscribe what A
said is the same whether the document is authenticated as
an ancient document or as, for example, a business record.
Likewise, the risk of mistake is increased when the author,
W, attempts to write down what A claims B stated. Like the
game of "telephone," each added level of hearsay increases
the risk of mistake. Business records have been repeatedly
held subject to the rule against multiple hearsay.83 The
minimization of mistake rationale behind the ancient docu-
ment exception to the hearsay rule cannot be used to justify
making statements in ancient documents exempt from the
rule against multiple hearsay.
The other rationale for the ancient document exception
to the hearsay rule offered by the Note to Rule 803(16) is that
the document's "age affords assurance that the writing ante-
80. Id.
81. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
82. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8).
83. United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1991);
Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 106 F.R.D. 327 (N.D. Ga. 1984); United
States v. Knudsen, 320 F. Supp. 878 (D. Wis. 1971).
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dates the present controversy."84 McCormick's first edition of
the Handbook on the Law of Evidence was in print at the
time the Note to Rule 803(16) was written.85 Section 298 of
the handbook observes that advocates of the ancient docu-
ment exception to the hearsay rule under the common law
argued that statements in ancient documents should qualify
as an exception to the ancient document rule because they
were sufficiently reliable.86  The common law required that
the ancient document be thirty years old. 7 It would be un-
likely that the author would have a motive to lie, especially
in a way calculated to influence the resolution of controversy
that would not be litigated for at least three decades.88 How-
ever, this rationale for the existence of the hearsay rule does
not necessarily support the proposition that statements in
ancient documents are not subject to the rule against multi-
ple hearsay. Instead, the opposite may be inferred.
For any document authenticated as ancient, there is
some chance that the author made an intentional misrepre-
sentation. There is also some chance, albeit slight, that the
author foresaw the dispute that has arisen some decades
later, and made the misrepresentation in a calculated at-
tempt to influence the dispute's outcome." Where the author
of an ancient document, W, attempts to record what another
person, A, has told her, the same risks of misrepresentation
exist with respect to A. There is a chance that A is lying and
a slight chance that A is lying in order to influence a latent
dispute. With each level of hearsay added to the ancient
document, the chance that someone in the chain of declarants
reflected in the document is lying (or at best not completely
accurate) will increase. Application of the rule against mul-
tiple hearsay to statements in ancient documents would
84. FED. R. EVID. 803(16), Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules.
85. The first edition of the HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE by Charles
T. McCormick was first published in 1954. The Notes of Advisory Committee
on Proposed Rules, including Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16), was published
with the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. See Act of Jan. 2,
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1939; Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-149, § 1(11), 89 Stat. 805.
86. MCCORMICK, supra note 77, § 298, at 623.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. For example, a company engaged in illegal dumping of hazardous waste
may falsify documents today in order to avoid liability in litigation it fears may




The Note to Rule 803(16) also cites Dallas County v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co.90 One might be tempted to
interpret its citation as proof that the ancient document rule
should be applied flexibly, so that where statements in an
ancient document fail to comply with the rule against multi-
ple hearsay, they are not automatically excluded. The better
interpretation, however, is that Dallas County is cited by
Rule 803(16) only to show the twin principles of necessity and
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that underlie
all exceptions to the hearsay rule.
In Dallas County, the plaintiff county brought an action
against its insurers for damages resulting from the collapse
of a courthouse tower.9" The county contended that the col-
lapse was caused by lightning, pointing to the presence of
charcoal and charred timbers in the tower debris.9' The de-
fendant insurers, however, claimed that the tower's collapse
was caused by a number of other factors. 93 They contended
that lightning had not struck the courthouse and that the
presence of charcoal and charred timbers was caused instead
by a fire that occurred half a century before. 94 In support of
this claim, the defendants offered a fifty-eight-year-old news-
paper article that had been written at the time of the fire,
which was admitted by the trial court over a hearsay objec-
tion.95
Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed.96 For purposes of determining why Dallas
County is cited by the Advisory Committee Note to Rule
803(16), a number of things about the opinion are significant.
First, the decision was rendered within the framework of
former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43.97 Rule 43 stated
90. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).





95. Id. at 390-91. "The plaintiff objected that the newspaper article was
hearsay; that is was not a business record nor an ancient document, nor was it
admissible under any recognized exception to the hearsay doctrine." Id. at 391.
96. Dallas, 286 F.2d at 398.
97. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 394
(5th Cir. 1961). Former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) provided:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes
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that a given piece of evidence was admissible if it was admis-
sible under any one of the following: federal statute, rules of
evidence of courts of equity, and rules of evidence of the fo-
rum state.98 The court found that this rule provided for lib-
eral rules of admissibility. Rule 43 did "not purport to pro-
hibit the admission of other relevant material probative
evidence which, in the considered exercise of judicial wisdom,
is trustworthy."99 Instead, the rule enabled "federal courts to
apply a liberal, flexible rule for the admissibility of evidence,
unencumbered by common law archaisms."' ° The portion of
Rule 43 cited by Dallas County has since been deleted and
replaced with the Federal Rules of Evidence, of which Rule
803(16) is a part.' Rather than providing a regime under
which evidence would be admitted under any of three sets of
rules, the Rules of Evidence are now more restrictive. "Hear-
say is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority or by act of Congress.' ' °
Another significant fact about Dallas County is that it
held the newspaper article was admissible not because it was
an ancient document, but rather because it was "necessary
and trustworthy.' 0 3 The facts reported in the opinion suggest
of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied
in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or
under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction
of the state in which the United States court is held. In any case, the
statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs and
the evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient




99. Dallas County, 286 F.2d at 394.
100. Id. at 395.
101. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 43(a) advisory committee notes.
Rule 43, entitled Evidence, has heretofore served as the basic rule of
evidence for civil cases in federal courts. Its very general provisions
are superseded by the detailed provisions of the new Rules of Evidence.
... Those [provisions of subpart (a)] dealing with admissibility of evi-
dence and competency of witnesses, however, are no longer needed or
appropriate since those topics are covered at large in the Rules of Evi-
dence. They are accordingly deleted.
Id.
102. FED. R. EVID. 802.
103. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th
Cir. 1961).
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that the article could have been properly authenticated as an
ancient document under the common law. 04  Nevertheless,
while the court stated that the plaintiff objected to the docu-
ment on grounds that it was hearsay not subject to the "an-
cient document" exception, the court refused to rest its hold-
ing on a finding that the article was an ancient document per
se.'05 Instead the court found that the newspaper article sat-
isfied the twin rationales behind every exception to the hear-
say rule, that is, necessity and circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. 10 Admitting the article was in some sense
necessary because the passage of a half-century since the un-
derlying event made it all but impossible to find a witness
who could recollect the event with any accuracy.107
Dallas County went on to explain how the newspaper ar-
ticle satisfied the second rationale behind all exceptions to
the hearsay rule, namely, circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.
In 1901[,] Selma, Alabama was a small town. Taking a
common sense view of this case, it is inconceivable to us
104. Id. at 391 n.1.
As a predicate for introducing the newspaper in evidence, the defen-
dants called to the stand the editor of the Selma Times-Journal who
testified that his publishing company maintains archives of the pub-
lished issues of the Times-Journal and of the Morning Times, its
predecessor, and that the archives contain the issue of the Morning
Times of Selma for June 9, 1901, offered in evidence.
Id. at 391. See also Recent Case, Evidence-Hearsay-Old Newspaper Article
Admitted as Evidence of Facts Contained on Grounds of Necessity and Trust-
worthiness, 15 VAND. L. REV. 288, 291 (1961) ("The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals [in Dallas County] might have upheld the district court on the basis of the
"ancient documents" exception, but, instead, it chose to base its holding on a
broader rule.").
105. Dallas, 286 F.2d at 395. "We do not characterize this newspaper as a
'business record', nor as an 'ancient document,' nor as any other readily identi-
fiable and happily tagged species of hearsay exceptions." Id. at 397-98.
106. Id. at 395.
107. Id. at 396.
The rationale behind the 'ancient documents' exception is applicable
here: after a long lapse of time, ordinary evidence regarding signatures
or handwriting is virtually unavailable, and it is therefore permissible
to resort to circumstantial evidence .... The ancient documents rule
applies to documents a generation or more in age. Here, the Selma
Times-Journal article is almost two generations old. The principle of
necessity, not requiring absolute impossibility or total inaccessibility of
first-hand knowledge, is satisfied by the practicalities of the situation
before us.
Id. at 397.
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that a newspaper reporter in a small town would report
there was a fire in the dome of the new courthouse-if
there had been no fire. He is without motive to falsify,
and a false report would have subjected the newspaper
and him to embarrassment in the community. The usual
dangers inherent in hearsay evidence, such as lack of
memory, faulty narration, intent to influence the court
proceedings, and plain lack of truthfulness are not present
here."10
What is the significance of the citation of Dallas County
by the Note to the ancient document exception at Rule
803(16)? One might argue that it was cited by the Advisory
Committee to reflect an intention that Rule 803(16) be ap-
plied flexibly. Under this interpretation, when one is con-
fronted by an authenticated ancient document that contains
multiple levels of hearsay, one should not mechanically ex-
clude those statements that do not separately meet excep-
tions to the rule. Instead, one should return to the twin poli-
cies of necessity and trustworthiness to determine whether
each statement should be admitted into evidence for the
truth of the matter asserted. One problem with this inter-
pretation is that Dallas County did not expressly address the
issue of multiple hearsay."19
A better interpretation of the Note's citation to Dallas
County is that it was cited only to provide case authority for
the Note's assertions of the policies behind the ancient docu-
ment rule, along with the other exceptions to the hearsay
rule. Statements within ancient documents are still subject
to the rules against multiple hearsay. Dallas County is not
an ancient document opinion and was decided under a more
108. Id.
109. One commentator has observed that the newspaper article
technically may have involved multiple hearsay [because] there was no
way of knowing whether the reporter wrote the story from his own
personal knowledge or from information obtained from eyewit-
nesses .... Under the approach taken in the Dallas County case,
however, it would seem that admissibility on the grounds of necessity
and trustworthiness either simultaneously satisfies or eliminates this
requirement.
Evidence: Admissibility of Newspapers Under the Hearsay Rule, 1961 DUKE
L.J. 460, 465 & n.26 (1961) [hereinafter Evidence]. See also Nino E. Green,
Evidence-Hearsay Evidence-A New Exception to the Rule?, 8 WAYNE L. REV.
332, 334 (1962) ("The newspaper account may well have been hearsay upon




liberal evidentiary regime. The citation is not an invitation
to use Rule 803(16) to create new exceptions to the hearsay
rule. This interpretation is supported by the existence of the
catch-all exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 807.11 This rule
provides that an out of court statement not specifically cov-
ered by an exception to the hearsay rule, "but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is
not excluded by the hearsay rule," if it satisfies three re-
quirements.' These are: (1) "the statement is offered as evi-
dence of a material fact;" (2) "the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence"
that can reasonably be obtained; and (3) the "general pur-
poses" of the Rules of Evidence and the "interests of justice
will best be served" by admitting the evidence." 2 This is the
rule that Dallas County presaged. The ancient document
rule need not be construed liberally, because Rule 807 serves
as a release valve for those statements that satisfy the policy
reasons behind the hearsay exceptions, but fail to satisfy the
letter of any of them. The catchall exception to the hearsay
rule would be unnecessary if the ancient document rule,
along with the other exceptions to the hearsay rule, were
construed to flexibly apply to statements that did not quite
satisfy their requirements.
This interpretation is consistent with the views of com-
mentators about the Dallas County opinion.13  At the time
the opinion was handed down it attracted a great deal of at-
tention. Commentators consistently characterized the opin-
ion as rooted not in the ancient document rule, but rather in
first principles of all the hearsay exceptions."' One commen-
tator explained:
The court accepted Wigmore's contention that all the well-
known hearsay exceptions are essentially based on the
110. FED. R. EVID. 807.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Evidence, supra note 109, at 465; David K. Kroll, Evidence-Hear-
say-Scope of Federal Rule 43(a), 60 MICH. L. REV. 105, 107 (1961); Allen P.
Miller, Evidence: Hearsay: Admissibility of Ancient Newspaper to Prove Matter
of Local Interest: Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388
(5th Cir. 1961), 46 CORNELL L. Q. 645, 649 (1961).
114. See e.g., Evidence, supra note 109, at 465 (1961) ("Refusing to resort to
traditional hearsay labels, the Court of Appeals in the Dallas County decision
employed basic analysis .... ).
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same two principles, i.e., necessity and circumstantial
guaranty of trustworthiness, and adopted these two crite-
ria as the test for admissibility of hearsay in the federal
courts. In thus refusing to be confined by the instructions
of the orthodox hearsay exceptions, and in adopting in-
stead the principles upon which they are based as a new
and complete exception, Dallas County has charted a lib-
eral course for the federal courts in the treatment of hear-
say evidence." 5
Other commentators echoed the view that Dallas County
created a "new" hearsay rule."6 The new rule was a flexible
rule that was premised on the same principles of "necessity"
and "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" that
formed the basis of every exception to the hearsay rule. The
basic thrust of this new rule has since become embodied in
the catchall exception to the hearsay rule. The citation in the
Advisory Committee Notes to Dallas County appears to be for
no other purpose than to illustrate the fundamental princi-
ples behind all exceptions to the hearsay rule, including the
ancient document rule.
That the rule against multiple hearsay should be applied
to statements in ancient documents is further demonstrated
by the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 803 as a whole.
The Preface to Rule 803 Notes of Advisory Committee on
Proposed Rules states: "[i]n a hearsay situation, the declar-
ant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule [Federal
Rule of Evidence 803] nor Rule 804 dispenses with the re-
quirement of first hand knowledge. It may appear from his
statement or be inferable from circumstances."'17 This state-
ment lends further support to the textual argument that the
language and structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence
make statements in ancient documents subject to the rule
against multiple hearsay. For each out of court statement
that is excepted from the rules against hearsay, the speaker
or author must have personal, or "first hand," knowledge of
115. Miller, supra note 113, at 649 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
116. "In the principle case [Dallas County], the court refused to rest its deci-
sion on the "business record" or "ancient document" exceptions to the hearsay
rule. Accepting the Monarch [Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960)]
dictum, the court went on to state its own test for governing admission of hear-
say evidence." Kroll, supra note 113, at 107 (emphasis added).




the matters stated. This follows from the competency re-
quirements for the testimony of a witness under Rule 602. If
the author does not have personal knowledge of those things,
then the statement must constitute speculation or hearsay.
The Preface makes clear that such speculation or hearsay
should be excluded.
It does not follow from this, however, that everything
about which the author of the ancient document lacks per-
sonal knowledge is excluded conclusively. The author's lack
of personal knowledge does not end the inquiry. The Preface
does not address the rule against multiple hearsay explicitly.
Rule 805 provides that "[h]earsay included within hearsay is
not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the com-
bined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay
rule provided in these rules."1 8 Nothing in the Preface is in-
consistent with the literal application of this rule to state-
ments in ancient documents. The multiple hearsay rule is a
sword as well as a shield. That is, if each level of hearsay in
an ancient document falls within an exception to the hearsay
rule, the statement is admissible. For example, if an ancient
document states that the author, A, saw B steal a loaf of
bread, then the statement would be admissible under Rule
803(16) by itself. This is because the author has personal
knowledge of the matter stated. If, however, an ancient
document states that the author, A, heard B say that B stole
a loaf of bread, then two levels of hearsay are present: A's
statement of what A heard, and B's statement of what B did.
A's lack of personal knowledge of what B did does not end the
inquiry. If B's statement satisfies an exception to the rule
against hearsay-such as the statement against interest ex-
ception at Rule 804(b)(3)'-then the statement is admissi-
ble. Pursuant to Rule 805, each level of hearsay would have
come within an exception to the hearsay rule and be admissi-
ble, even though the author of the ancient document lacked
personal knowledge of the matter stated.
118. FED. R. EVID. 805.
119. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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IV. STATEMENTS IN ANCIENT DOCUMENTS WERE SUBJECT TO
THE RULE AGAINST MULTIPLE HEARSAY UNDER THE COMMON
LAW
The Supreme Court has stated that courts may look to a
Federal Rule of Evidence's common law antecedent to help
interpret it."' Prior to the enactment of Rule 803(16) in 1975,
the rules concerning the admissibility of statements in an-
cient documents under the common law was an issue as to
which there was no uniformity of opinion. This subject was
addressed in an article published in 1930 by Professor Joseph
Wickes."' He argued that "although some of the courts have
flatly rejected such evidence, in most of the cases in which re-
citals in ancient instruments have been offered in evidence
testimonially in American courts and the issue has been
squarely presented to the appellate court, the evidence has
been held to be admissible."' As for the conditions under
which "recitals," or statements, in ancient documents had
been admitted up to that time, Professor Wickes contended
the following:
in most of the cases.., the recitals were of such a nature
as to render it clear that the facts recited were within the
personal knowledge of the declarant; and in the few cases
where the question has been squarely presented for deci-
sion the recitals have been rejected in most instances
where they were not clearly made on personal knowl-
edge.
123
There is a better way to characterize the common law be-
fore and after Professor Wickes' article, up to the enactment
of Rule 803(16): statements in an authenticated ancient
document are admissible only where it can be reasonably in-
ferred from the document itself, or from independent evi-
dence, that the author would be competent to testify to those
facts. Essentially, the matters stated would have to be
within the author's personal knowledge, be covered by a
hearsay exception, or otherwise contain circumstantial guar-
antees of trustworthiness. An examination of a number of
decisions under the common law ancient document rule-in-
120. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
121. Wickes, supra note 12, at 451.
122. Id. at 457-58 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 469 (citations omitted).
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cluding a number cited by Professor Wickes-reveals how
this is so. 24
Where common law decisions have addressed the issue
expressly, they have conditioned admissibility of statements
in the ancient document to be matters about which the
author would be competent to testify. In Kirkpatrick v. Tapo
Oil Co.,12 the California District Court of Appeal held that a
statement in an ancient document referring to the author's
purchase of certificates of stock was admissible over an objec-
tion that the ancient document rule was a rule of authentica-
tion only and the document was hearsay. 2 ' The court ex-
plained that "an ancient document is admitted in evidence as
proof of the facts recited therein, provided the writer would
have been competent to testify as to such facts." 7  The
author's apparent personal knowledge of his purchase of
stock recorded in the document demonstrated his compe-
tence.12'
Similar reasoning has been used in decisions under the
common law to exclude statements in ancient documents. In
Brig Juno v. United States,'29 the United States Court of
Claims excluded from evidence statements in an ancient
newspaper article, which were offered to prove that the
French government had engaged in certain acts.'30 The court
reasoned: "[w]ho furnished the information to the newspaper
and whence it came we do not know. How much truth there
is in it we cannot say .... [A] s proof of the illegal acts of the
124. A number of common law decisions have held that authenticating a
document as ancient does not automatically result in any statements in the
document being admitted into evidence, whether made on personal knowledge
or not. See, e.g., Town of Ninety-Six v. Southern Railway Co., 267 F.2d 579, 583
(4th Cir. 1959) ("The fact that an instrument is an ancient document does not
affect its admissibility in evidence further than to dispense with proof of its
genuineness."); King v. Watkins, 98 F. 913, 917 (W.D. Va. 1899) ("[Q]uestions of
its [the authenticated ancient document] relevancy and admissibility as evi-
dence cannot be affected by the fact that it is an ancient document."), rev'd on
other grounds, 118 F. 524 (4th Cir. 1902); Gwin v. Calegaris, 73 P. 851 (Cal.
1903) (dictum) ("The rule as to ancient documents, as we understand it, does
not import any verity to the recitals contained in these instruments.").
125. 301 P.2d 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
126. Kirkpatrick v. Tapo Oil Co., 301 P.2d 274, 278-79 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1956).
127. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
128. See id.
129. 41 Ct. Cl. 106 (Ct. Cl. 1906).
130. Brig Juno v. United States, 41 Ct. Cl. 106,109 (Ct. Cl. 1906).
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French it is absolutely worthless."3 ' Statements of family
relationships in an ancient family prayer book were excluded
for like reasons in an intestacy proceeding in In re Whalen. 32
The Surrogate's Court of New York stated the rule that the
author of the ancient document "must be related by blood or
affinity to the family concerning which he speaks, and
moreover his relationship by blood or affinity must be estab-
lished by evidence of other than his own declarations.' 33 The
court held that there was no independent evidence demon-
strating that the author of the statements of family relation-
ships in the ancient prayer book was in fact related to the
family written about and, therefore, excluded those state-
ments from evidence.' Also, in In re Barney,'35 the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York faced a challenge
to the admissibility of statements in otherwise authentic an-
cient hospital records. The court surveyed the law on ancient
documents:
so far as drawn to our attention or we have found, the rec-
ords and entries, which have been received in evidence
under this rule, related not to opinions but to facts pre-
sumably within the knowledge of the party making the re-
cord or entry [in the ancient document], whose death after
[thirty] years is presumed, and concerning which it would
have been competent for him to have given testimony if liv-
ing.
136
The court excluded the statements on the ground that
they were not statements of fact or opinion by someone
shown competent to make them. 37 Instead, the objectionable
statements "constitute[d] narratives of past events and con-
clusions" and "opinions" without any demonstrated compe-
tent basis.'38
Thus, in each of Brig Juno, In re Whalen, and In re
Barney, the court excluded statements in what would have
otherwise been an authentic ancient document. They did this
not simply because the author lacked personal knowledge of
131. Id.
132. 261 N.Y.S. 761 (Sur. Ct. 1932).
133. In re Whalen, 261 N.Y.S. 761, 775 (Sur. Ct. 1932).
134. Id. at 776-77.
135. 174 N.Y.S. 242 (App. Div. 1919).
136. In re Barney, 174 N.Y.S. 242, 254 (App. Div. 1919) (emphasis added).




the matters written, but rather because he would have lacked
competence to testify about them. In Brig Juno the court as-
sumed that the author of the newspaper article lacked per-
sonal knowledge about the things written about and stated
that there was no evidence as to who provided the informa-
tion to the author. Implicit in this denial of admissibility was
the idea that even though the newspaper author lacked per-
sonal knowledge of the matters written, he might nonethe-
less be competent to testify about them if the statements bore
other circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness so that
they were excepted from the rule against hearsay.9
Likewise, In re Whelan excluded the family relationship
statements in the prayer book not because the author lacked
personal knowledge of what was stated, but because there
was no independent evidence that the author was related to
the individuals about whom he wrote. An individual's
knowledge about anyone's family tree-even his own-is
rarely completely within that individual's personal knowl-
edge, but is instead often based on hearsay.'4 ° The court im-
plicitly reasoned that an author's statements in an ancient
document about his own family tree bear circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness that make them admissible."'
Finally, in In re Barney, the court made clear that it was
excluding statements of medical opinion in the ancient docu-
ment not because the author lacked personal knowledge, but
because there was no evidence that those opinions were ren-
dered by someone qualified to make them, such as a doctor.
"It does not appear who made these entries or who made the
139. For a list of the exceptions to the hearsay rule recognized by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, see FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23), 804, 807.
140. See Evidence, supra note 109, at 464 n.25 ("Upon analysis exceptions
admitting reputation as to family pedigree and local history will all involve, on
occasion, multiple hearsay, for all of these exceptions are based upon the pass-
ing of 'word-of-mouth' assertions from generation to generation.").
141. Two hearsay exceptions recognized by the Federal Rules of Evidence are
relevant to the facts stated in In re Whelan. Rule 803(13) excepts from the
hearsay rule: "Statements of fact concerning personal or family history con-
tained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on
family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like." FED.
R. EVID. 803(13). Rule 803(19) excepts from the hearsay rule: "Reputation
among members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among
a person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adop-
tion, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or
marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history." FED. R.
EVID. 803(19).
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diagnosis or whether they were made by competent medical
experts."4 2  "[Miedical experts on mental diseases
may... give their opinions on acts and conditions observed
and found and stated by them, or on other facts assumed to be
true, with respect to the precise mental state of the person.
Thus in Brig Juno, In re Whalen, and In re Barney, the test
for determining the admissibility of statements in ancient
documents turned on whether the document's author would
have been competent to testify about the matters stated-
whether by personal knowledge, as a qualified expert, or by
an exception to the rule against hearsay.
A number of other decisions under the common law have
held that statements in ancient documents were admissi-
ble. 44 While none of these decisions expressly conditions ad-
missibility of statements on it being shown that the author
would be competent to testify about them, in each decision
these facts were present. In some of these decisions it may
reasonably be inferred from the circumstances that the
author of the ancient document had personal knowledge of
the matters stated. Examples of statements admitted by
these decisions include statements by a person claiming own-
ership to show such a claim was made, "5 and a map made by
"a surveyor of acknowledged skill and accuracy"'46 or by the
142. See In re Barney, 174 N.Y.S. at 256.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. See, e.g., Wilson v. Snow, 228 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1913); McClaskey v.
Barr, 47 F. 154, 169 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1891), rev'd on other grounds, 70 F. 529 (6th
Cir. 1895); Basch v. United States, 52 Ct. Cl. 134, 157-59 (Ct. Cl. 1917); Walker
v. Town of Fruithurst, 130 So.2d 12, 14 (Ala. 1961); In re Nidever's Estate, 5
Cal. Rptr. 343, 349 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Geary St., Park and Ocean R.R. v.
Campbell, 179 P. 453, 454 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919); Whitman v. Shaw, 44 N.E.
333, 335-36 (Mass. 1896); Layton v. Kraft, 98 N.Y.S. 72, 75-76 (App. Div. 1906);
Burgan v. Siegman, 9 Ohio App. 84, 89 (1917); Schultz v. Shatto, 237 S.W.2d
609, 613 (Tex. 1951); Bruni v. Vidaurri, 166 S.W.2d 81, 90-91 (Tex. 1942);
Magee v. Paul, 221 S.W. 254, 257 (Tex.1920); Howard v. Russell, 12 S.W. 525,
527 (Tex. 1889); Keppler v. City of Richmond, 98 S.E. 747, 751-52 (Va. 1919);
City of Spokane v. Catholic Bishop, 206 P.2d 277, 281 (Wash. 1949); Barrows v.
Kenosha County, 98 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Wis. 1959).
145. See Magee v. Paul, 221 S.W. 254, 257 (Tex. 1920).
146. Whitman v. Shaw, 44 N.E. 333, 335 (Mass. 1896). The map was admit-
ted because there were additional circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
as well: "It is apparent from an inspection of the plan [map] and the evidence
that it related to actual transactions. It is not to be supposed that such a plan
was made for amusement." Id. See also Skipper v. Yow, 81 S.E. 2d 200, 202
(N.C. 1954) (dictum) ("[Ancient document rule] has come to be considered an
exception to the hearsay rule and under certain conditions renders recitals in
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former owner of the property. 147  In many of the decisions
admitting statements in ancient documents, however, per-
sonal knowledge cannot be inferred from the circumstances.
Instead, there are circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness-including many specifically recognized as hearsay ex-
ceptions-that support the admission of these statements.
These include statements in a business' contemporaneous re-
cords of inventory48 or stock subscriptions,'149 a map from the
office of the county assessor, 5 ' or survey15 or declaration con-
cerning family relationships, 5' church records on baptisms,
deeds admissible even against strangers.") (emphasis added).
147. See Burgan v. Siegman, 9 Ohio App. 84, 89 (1917).
148. See Basch v. United States, 52 Ct. Cl. 134, 157-59 (Ct. Cl. 1917). The
court was careful to emphasize that these admitted records were not just nar-
rative of past transactions, but instead were themselves contemporaneous or at
least reflected other, since lost, contemporaneous records. Id. at 159. "[T]he
ancient record of bills of sale or receipted invoices may themselves show that
there were original bills of sale or receipted invoices in existence when the cop-
ies were made." Id. This brings these documents close to the business record
exception now recognized by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).
149. See Geary St., Park and Ocean R.R. v. Campbell, 179 P. 453 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1919).
The books of the company received in evidence were more than thirty
years old. The secretary of the plaintiff, who had occupied that posi-
tion for many years, produced them, and testified that they were
turned over to him in the ordinary course of business when he became
such secretary, as the books of the corporation, and he identified them
as such.
Id. These documents come close to qualifying under the business record excep-
tion now recognized by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). See FED. R. EVID.
803(6).
150. See Walker v. Town of Fruithurst, 130 So.2d 12, 17 (Ala. 1961).
Maps, surveys, etc., purporting to be thirty years old or more are said
to prove themselves and are admissible in evidence without the ordi-
nary requirements as to proof of execution or handwriting if relevant
to the inquiry, when produced from proper custody, on their face free
from suspicion and authorized or recognized as official documents.
Id. The map came from the records of the county tax assessor. Id. These facts
make the public records exception now recognized at Federal Rule of Evidence
803(8) close to being applicable. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
151. See Barrows v. Kenosha County, 98 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Wis. 1959).
"An original map, over thirty years old, found in proper custody, authorized or
recognized as an official document, and free on its face of suspicion, is admissi-
ble in evidence as an 'ancient document' to prove the location of a boundary
line." Id. at 465 (internal quotation marks omitted). The map came from the
records of the county surveyor. Id. The public records exception to the hearsay
rule at Federal rule of Evidence 803(8) is close to being satisfied by this map.
See FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
152. See McClaskey v. Barr, 47 F. 154, 169 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1891), rev'd on
other grounds, 70 F. 529 (6th Cir. 1895) (ancient will); In re Nidever's Estate, 5
Cal. Rptr. 343, 349 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) ("Ancient documents may be admitted
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marriages, and deaths of parishioners to show pedigree,"3 a
sheriffs return on execution of a judgment and sheriffs deeds
regarding existence of a street next to the subject proper-
ties, an agreement of partition and a deed for real property
on the claim that partition had been made,' "blueprints," or
copies of plat maps from the files of a city engineer on a
boundary,'56 a deed for the proposition that grantor has
in evidence as proof of the facts recited therein, provided the writers would
have been competent to testify as to such facts.") (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (emphasis added). Statements concerning family relationships may be
admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule under Federal Rule of Evidence
803(13) and 803(19). See FED. R. EVID. 803(13), 803(19).
153. See Layton v. Kraft, 98 N.Y.S. 72, 75 (1906). "[A] question of pedigree
forms an exception to the general rule as to the proof of a particular fact by
hearsay, reputation or tradition." Id.
Notwithstanding the fact that proof of handwriting was not made, and
that there was no evidence that the entries were in the handwriting of
one who was then clerk of the [church], or that there was a rule re-
quiring such records to be kept, we think the records of marriages, and
baptisms and deaths kept by that church were competent evidence and
should have been received upon trial.
Id. Statements concerning family relationships may be admissible as excep-
tions to the hearsay rule under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(13) and 803(19).
See FED. R. EVID. 803(13), 803(19).
154. See Schultz v. Shatto, 237 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. 1951). These docu-
ments may be admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule under Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(15), which applies to any
statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an
interest in property in the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of
the document, unless dealings with the property since the document
was made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or
the purport of the document.
FED. R. EVID. 803(15).
155. See Bruni v. Vidaurri, 166 S.W.2d 81, 90-91 (Tex. 1942) ("It is of course
recognized that, by exception to the hearsay rule, the recitals in the two ancient
documents are admissible as evidence of the facts recited."). Statements in
these documents, which affect an interest in property, may be admissible as ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(15). See FED.
R. EVID. 803(15).
156. See City of Spokane v. Catholic Bishop, 206 P.2d 277, 281 (Wash. 1949).
"[W]hether admitted as ancient documents or as properly authenticated copies
of a lost or unobtainable ancient document, the recitals therein may properly be
employed to evidence the truth of the facts recited." Id. (citing Wickes, supra
note 12, in which it is demonstrated that the majority of courts correctly take a
similar view).
The fact that the documents were ancient was not the sole basis for admitting
them for the truth of the matters stated in them: "Further, and most important,
the contents of the blueprints are thoroughly corroborated by other evidence in
the case." Id. The copies of the plat maps, which were found in the files of the
city engineer, contain words of dedication, and include a written acknowledg-
ment by a notary public, come close to being admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8). See FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
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authority to transfer property5 7 and the width of an alley
adjoining the property,'58 and records of a masonic temple to
prove identity of member.'59 There are cases, however, where
ancient documents have been admitted for the truth of the
matters stated therein, without indicia of trustworthiness
and reliability.6 ° The majority of common law decisions,
however, appears to be consistent with the proposition that
statements in ancient documents are admissible only where
the author of that document would be competent to testify to
the matters stated. Such competency rests on the author's
personal knowledge or a separate exception to the rule
against hearsay.
157. See Wilson v. Snow, 228 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1913). The deed's recital that
it "had been executed under the power of sale conferred by the will was suffi-
cient to show that the nominated executrix had taken the oath and qualified as
such." Id. This statement, contained as it is in a document that affects an in-
terest in property, may be admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(15). See FED. R. EVID. 803(15).
158. See Keppler v. City of Richmond, 98 S.E. 747, 751 (Va. 1919). "We are
of the opinion that the Hirsh deed (being over thirty years old), was admissible
in evidence against appellants, although they are not in privity therewith, un-
der the exception which ancient deeds afford to the rule as to inadmissibility of
hearsay evidence." Id. at 750.
159. See Howard v. Russell, 12 S.W. 525, 527 (Tex. 1889).
[R]ecitals in ancient documents have been admitted in proof of facts
therein stated even as to persons not parties to them. In this case the
entry on the lodge minutes was more than thirty years old, and we
think the presumption should be after such a lapse of time that the en-
try was correctly made. Copies of church registers have been admitted
in cases of pedigree in courts of the highest authority in this country.
It would seem therefore that in a case like this, in order to prove a fact
occurring fifty years ago, the records of an ancient and well established
society may be resorted to upon a question of pedigree.
Id. These recitals may qualify as hearsay exceptions under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(6) (business records) and 803(19) (reputation concerning family).
See FED. R. EVID. 803(6), 803(19).
160. See Drake v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 227 So.2d 709, 711 (Fla. 1969).
Map was held admissible as an ancient document to prove truth of boundary
indicated in it, without any circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
stated. See id. The map, however, did come from "the office of the defendant's
City Engineer." Id.; see also Devereaux v. Frazier, 248 Cal. App. 2d 323, 331
(1967) (admitting ancient guaranty for truth of matters stated therein with no
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness).
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V. THE FEW DECISIONS THAT HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE HAVE HELD THAT
STATEMENTS IN ANCIENT DOCUMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE
RULE AGAINST MULTIPLE HEARSAY
A number of decisions have addressed the admissibility
of ancient documents under Rule 803(16)."' Most of these
decisions have admitted statements in ancient documents
into evidence over objection that they are inadmissible hear-
say. In none of the decisions in which statements in ancient
documents have been admitted over a double hearsay objec-
tion, however, was the issue of multiple hearsay or Rule 805
raised. The few decisions that have discussed the multiple
hearsay rule in the context of statements in ancient docu-
ments have uniformly held that such statements are subject
to the rule against multiple hearsay.'62 Many, though not all,
of the decisions that have admitted statements in ancient
documents for the truth of the matter asserted are consistent
with the view that those statements must come within the
personal knowledge of the author or fall within a separate
exception to the hearsay rule.6 '
161. See, e.g., United States v. Hajda, 135 F.3d 439, 442-44 (7th Cir. 1997);
George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir 1994); United States v. Koziy,
728 F.2d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 1984); Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Fed-
eral Power Comm'n, 557 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Ilileikis,
929 F. Supp. 31, 38 (D. Mass. 1996); United States v. Stelmokas, No. 92-3440,
1995 WL 464264 at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 1995); Sokaogon Chippewa Commu-
nity v. Exxon Corp., 805 F. Supp. 680, 710-11 & n.34 (E.D. Wis. 1992); Gonzales
v. North Township of Lake County, 800 F. Supp. 676, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1992),
rev'd on other grounds, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993); Columbus-America Discov-
ery Group, Inc. v. Sailing Vessel, 742 F. Supp. 1327, 1343 (E.D. Va. 1990), rev'd
on other grounds, 974 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1992); Fulmer v. Connors, 665 F. Supp.
1472, 1490 (N.D. Ala. 1987); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688, 695 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987); Baker v.
City of Kissimee, 645 F. Supp. 571, 576 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (dicta); Compton v.
Davis Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Wyo. 1985); Ammons v. Dade City,
Fla, 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1280 n.8 (M.D. Fla. 1984); Bell v. Combined Registry
Co., 397 F. Supp. 1274, 1280 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Estate of Cole v. Commis-
sioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 715, 720-23 (T.C. Nov. 20, 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 963 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Rhode Island Asbestos Cases, 11
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (CBC) 444, 447-48 (D.R.I. July 7,1982).
162. Hajda, 135 F.3d at 442-44; Stelmokas, No. 92-3440, 1995 WL 464264 at
*5-6; Estate of Cole 58 T.C.M. at 720-23; In re Rhode Island Asbestos Cases, 11
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. at 447-48.
163. See George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1994); Columbus-
America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Sailing Vessel, 742 F. Supp. 1327, 1343 (E.D.
Va. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 974 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1992); Fulmer v. Con-
nors, 665 F. Supp. 1472, 1479 (D. Wyo. 1985); Compton v. Davis Oil Company,
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Of the few decisions addressing the applicability of the
multiple hearsay rule to statements in ancient documents,
the one with the most complete analysis is United States v.
Stelmokas. T' In that case, the government sought to admit
into evidence a fifty year-old report in connection with a de-
naturalization action against an alleged World War II era
Nazi collaborator.'65  Although the report was properly
authenticated as an ancient document, Stelmokas objected on
the grounds that the author of the report did not have per-
sonal knowledge of the matters stated in it, but rather re-
corded the statements of other witnesses, and those matters
were therefore inadmissible as hearsay.'66 The government
argued that the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16)
"is sufficiently broad to provide an exception for statements
made by the author of the ancient document and for hearsay
statements within the document, that the rationale underly-
ing the ancient document hearsay exception applies equally
to all such statements.' 67
The court rejected the government's argument and ex-
cluded the hearsay statements within the report. The court's
analysis rested in part on the text and structure of Rules 803
and 805 and in part on the policies behind the ancient docu-
ment exception to the hearsay rule:
[a]s a general matter, evidence admitted under the hear-
say exceptions in Rule 803 remains subject to the multiple
hearsay requirement of Rule 805. If the law were other-
wise, Rule 805 would be rendered superfluous. More im-
portant, the government's argument overlooks the fact
that age is not the sole indicia of trustworthiness under-
lying the Rule 803(16) exception. The requirement that
the ancient document be written generally guarantees the
factfinder possesses the statement of the documents
author made more than [twenty] years ago without risk of
mistransmission. However, there is no guarantee that a
hearsay statement contained in the document is accurate.
The author of the ancient document may have misheard or
misunderstood the hearsay statement or his written words
may not convey the meaning intended by the hearsay de-
607 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Wyo. 1985); Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F.
Supp. 1241, 1246-47 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
164. No. 92-3440, 1995 WL 464264 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 1995).
165. Id. at *5.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *6.
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clarant. These issues of perception and narration are not
merely peripheral but are fundamental problems of hear-
say evidence. Consequently, hearsay statements con-
tained within an ancient document lack the same indicia
of trustworthiness and reliability that provide the ration-
ale for admitting statements where the declarant is the
author of the ancient document. It is for these reasons
that the court interprets Rule 803(16) as an exception to
the hearsay rule only for statements where the declarant
is the author of the ancient document. This ruling best
gives effect to the combined purposes of Rules 803(16) and
805. 168
The court went on to distinguish a number of cases cited
by the government, including Dallas County v. Commercial
Union Assurance Co.,169 on the ground that none of those
cases involved an ancient document with multiple levels of
hearsay."17
Other decisions have also held that statements within
authentic ancient documents are subject to the rule against
multiple hearsay.'71 While the basis for these decisions is less
than clear, it appears to be based on the language and struc-
ture of Rules 803 and 805. Like United States v. Stelmokas,
the court in United States v. Hajda72 faced the admissibility
of statements in ancient documents in the context of a de-
naturalization action brought by the government against an
individual who allegedly collaborated with the Nazis during
World War II. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
treated the admissibility of ancient documents and the ad-
missibility of statements within those ancient documents as
two separate questions:
These documents are more than [twenty] years old and
they were properly authenticated, so they are exceptions
to the hearsay rule admissible under Rule 803(16) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. However, this admissibility
exception applies only to the document itself. If the docu-
168. Id. at *6; see STRONG, supra note 12, § 245, at 93.
169. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
170. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th
Cir. 1961).
171. See United States v. Hajda, 135 F.3d 439, 442-44 (7th Cir. 1997); Estate
of Cole v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 715, 720-23 (T.C. Nov. 20, 1989),
rev'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Rhode Island Asbes-
tos Cases, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (CBC) 444, 447-48 (D.R.I. July 7, 1982).
172. 135 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 1997).
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ment contains more than one level of hearsay, an appro-
priate exception must be found for each level.
173
The court went on to find that the statements within the
ancient documents were admissible. Some of the statements
were admissible because, although they were prepared by
someone else, the "declarant signed and adopted them, so
they contain only one level of hearsay."174 Although not ex-
pressly stated by the court as a basis for its reasoning, it is
clear from the facts recited in the opinion that it is reason-
able to conclude that each declarant had personal knowledge
of the matters stated in the ancient document. One set of
statements were signed and adopted by Nazi prison camp
guards who said that the defendant, who was also a guard,
"beat and shot prisoners and took part in the massacre on the
last day the camp was open."'' Another set of statements
were signed and adopted by the defendant's sister, and stated
that her "brother served in the German military" and "was
employed in the so-called 'Wachmannschaft' [guard forces].
It is unlikely that the court would have found it significant,
for purposes of the rule against multiple hearsay, that these
declarants signed and adopted these statements unless the
court believed that each declarant had personal knowledge of
the matters stated. If the declarants had no competency
whatsoever to testify as to those matters, the fact that they
signed and adopted statements as to those matters should be
irrelevant. Those statements would still be inadmissible.
By contrast, this rationale was unavailable to support
the admission of another statement purportedly made by the
defendant's father, Stanislaw, at a collaboration trial fifty
years earlier. The record from the collaboration trial re-
ported that Stanislaw said, "My son [the defendant] went to
Germany to join in the SS. ' '177 The Hajda court explained
that "Stanislaw's statement... isn't signed, so it contains
two levels of hearsay. The document itself falls under
Fed[erall R[ule] [of] Evid[ence] 803(16), but Stanislaw's ac-
tual statement needs a separate exception in order to be ad-
173. Hajda, 135 F.3d at 444 (citing FED. R. EVID. 805).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 442.
176. Id. at 443.
177. United States v. Hajda, 135 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
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missible. Here, the proper exception is a declaration against
interest.'17  Unlike the statements in ancient documents at-
tributed to other witnesses, because Stanislaw's statement
was not signed by him, it was not his statement at all.179
Rather, it was a statement by some official, the author of the
ancient document, at the collaboration trial about what he
thought he heard Stanislaw say.8 ' This presented a second
level of hearsay for which a separate exception to the hearsay
rule must apply in order for the statement to be admissible.
The court went on to hold that the declaration against inter-
est exception at Rule 804(b)(3) applied to make the author's
representation of what Stanislaw said admissible. 8'
In In re Rhode Island Asbestos Cases'82 the court ex-
cluded as hearsay, statements in documents that were them-
selves admissible as ancient documents.'83 The court ex-
plained that "some of the statements in the documents are
hearsay within hearsay; that is, the writer of the document
is, in some instances, making assertions on the basis of sec-
ond-hand information." 4 To the extent the statements were
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the court held
that "some statements are inadmissible hearsay within hear-
say," citing Rule 805.85 The court acknowledged that per-
sonal knowledge on the part of the author of the ancient
document would result in the statement being admitted.'86
The court engaged in similar analysis in Estate of Cole v.
Commissioner.87 There the estate of Nat "King" Cole sought
to establish the tax deductibility of certain items by proving
that legitimate claims were made against the estate8  The
evidence offered by the estate consisted of "creditors' claim




182. 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (CBC) 444 (D.R.I. July 7,1982).
183. In re Rhode Island Asbestos Cases, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (CBC) 444,
447-48 (D.R.I. July 7,1982).
184. Id. at 447.
185. Id. at 448.
186. Id.
187. 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 715, 720-23 (T.C. Nov. 20, 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 963 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1992).
188. Estate of Cole v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 715, 720 (T.C. Nov.
20, 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1992).720.
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forms" that had been filed in a separate action.189 Each form
was signed not by the claimant himself, but rather by the
claimant's representative.' The IRS objected on the grounds
that even if the claim forms were themselves admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule, the statements in the claim
forms constituted a second level of hearsay for which no ex-
ception existed."' The court explained the applicability of the
rule against multiple hearsay:
Fed[eral] R[ule] [of] Evid[ence] 805 makes it clear that
hearsay within hearsay is not admissible unless each of
the hearsay components independently satisfies an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. Thus, a statement on a claim
form (e.g., the statement of the Superior Court that it ap-
proves the claim) based upon statements made by other
persons (e.g., the claimant's statement that it has a legiti-
mate claim) is multiple hearsay if offered to prove the
truth of the matters asserted by such other person (e.g.,
that the claimant has a legitimate claim). Supporting af-
fidavits, letters, and copies of notes in the claim forms are
likewise subject to the restrictions of Fed[eral] R[ule] [of]
Evid[encel 805. Unless petitioner, as proponent of the
claim forms in question, shows that the claims forms come
within an exception to the hearsay rule at this second
level, the matters asserted at this second level are not ad-
missible.'92
The court rejected the estate's argument that the ancient
document rule allowed those statements to be admitted into
evidence.
[Petitioner has not shown that the declarants of the sec-
ond-level statements, specifically the claimant representa-
tives who executed the claim forms, had first hand knowl-
edge. "In a hearsay situation, the declarant is, of course, a
witness, and neither this rule [Federal Rule of Evidence
803] nor [Federal Rule Evidence] Rule 804 dispenses with
the requirement of first hand knowledge."
193
A number of decisions have admitted into evidence
189. Id. at 722.
190. Id. at 723.
191. Id. at 722-23.
192. Id. at 723.
193. Estate of Cole v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 715, 720-23 (T.C. Nov.
20, 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing FED. R.
EVID. 803 advisory committee's notes).
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statements in ancient documents without determining that
either it is reasonably clear from the circumstances that the
author has personal knowledge of the matters stated or that
a separate exception to the hearsay rule applies.' Never-
theless, many of these decisions are consistent with the view
that the author's personal knowledge or other circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness must be shown in order for a
statement within an ancient document to be admitted for the
truth of the matter stated. In some of these decisions, it can
be inferred from the circumstances that the author of the an-
cient document had personal knowledge. For example, in
Compton v. Davis Oil Co., 9' the court held that statements in
two warranty deeds and a death certificate that two indi-
viduals were husband and wife were admissible.'96 The two
warranty deeds were executed by the married couple, while
the death certificate was executed by the brother of the hus-
band, "with whom [the husband] was very close."'97 In George
v. Celotex Corp.,"' the court admitted statements in a report
under the ancient document rule.'99 The report was a study
of asbestos plants authored by an engineer for an asbestos
institute, in which the engineer stated that the scientific evi-
dence on the safety of asbestos was obscure, questioned the
methods used, and urged additional studies."' Likewise, in
194. See, e.g.,, George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1994); United
States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 1984); Connecticut Light and
Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 557 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Ilileikis, 929 F. Supp. 31, 38 (D. Mass. 1996); Sokaogon Chippewa
Community v. Exxon Corp., 805 F. Supp. 680, 710-11 & n. 34 (E.D. Wis. 1992);
Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County, 800 F. Supp. 676, 681 (N.D. Ind.
1992), rev'd on other grounds, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993); Columbus-America
Discovery Group, Inc. v. Sailing Vessel, 742 F. Supp. 1327, 1343 (E.D. Va.
1990), rev'd on other grounds, 974 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1992); Fulmer v. Connors,
665 F. Supp. 1472, 1490 (N.D. Ala. 1987); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp.
688, 695 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1987); Baker v. City of Kissimee, 645 F. Supp. 571, 576 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 1986)
(dicta); Compton v. Davis Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Wyo. 1985); Am-
mons v. Dade City, Fla., 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1280 n.8 (M.D. Fla. 1984); Bell v.
Combined Registry Co., 397 F. Supp. 1241, 1246-47 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See also
Trustees of German Township v. Farmers and Citizens Savings Bank Co., 113
N.E. 2d 409 (Ohio C.P. 1953) (common law).
195. 607 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Wyo. 1985).
196. Compton v. Davis Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Wyo. 1985).
197. Id. at 1223-24.
198. 914 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1990).
199. George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1990).
200. Id. at 29.
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Bell v. Combined Registry Co.,2"1 the court admitted into evi-
dence pieces of correspondence as ancient documents. 20 2 The
correspondence was discussed at length to support the court's
holding that there was a forfeiture of a copyright in a poem
because of its widespread distribution during World War II.'
The court relied on such statements of personal knowledge as
"I must have given away a thousand copies [of the poem] in
the last few years," and "I shall have it multigraphed for dis-
tribution to the soldiers ....
In most of the ancient document cases in which state-
ments were admitted without a finding that either the author
had personal knowledge of the matters stated, or a separate
exception to the hearsay rule applied, it appears highly un-
likely that the author had personal knowledge. 25 Nor does it
appear from these opinions that a separate exception to the
hearsay rule was technically applicable to the statement that
was admitted. Nevertheless, for many of these statements
there existed circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to
justify their admission into evidence to prove the truth of the
matters asserted. For example, in Columbus-America Dis-
covery Group, Inc. v. Sailing Vessel,2 °6 the court acknowledged
that the admissibility of statements in ancient documents, in
this case newspapers, is limited. "There are some restric-
tions on the admissibility of such articles to prove the truth
of certain statements for the truth of their content."
20 7 Co-
lumbus addressed the admissibility of newspaper articles
concerning the sinking of a passenger ship, the "Central
201. 397 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ill.. 1975).
202. Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F. Supp. 1241, 1246-47 (N.D. Ill..
1975).
203. Id. at 1248-49.
204. Id. at 1247.
205. See generally Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County, 800 F. Supp.
676, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993)
(newspaper articles); Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Sailing Ves-
sel, 742 F. Supp. 1327, 1343 (E.D. Va. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 974 F.2d
446 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); Fulmer v. Connors, 665 F. Supp. 1472, 1490 (N.D.
Ala. 1987) (same); Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1280 n.8 (M.D. Fla.
1984) (same). See also STRONG, supra note 12, § 323, at 360 n.15 ("[F]irst hand
knowledge by news reporters will generally be the exception rather than the
rule.").
206. 742 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Va. 1990).
207. Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Sailing Vessel, 742 F. Supp.
1327, 1342 (E.D. Va. 1990).
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America," in 1857 while sailing to New York City."8 The no-
toriety of this tragedy formed the basis of the court's holding
that it should be admitted. "Even if there be restrictions on
the use of newspaper articles that are admitted in evidence,
where they deal with such an event as the sinking of the
Central America, they are admissible as an ancient docu-
ment.""0 9 Circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness were
also present in Fulmer v. Connors.21° There the court found
that forty year-old payroll records of a mining company were
admissible for the truth of the matters asserted under Rule
803(16). The court observed that the records were treated by
others, including the parties opposing their admission, "as
true and correct business entries of Daisy City Coal Co. made
in the regular course of its coal mining business."1 ' The
documents all but qualified as business records under Rule
803(6).212
While a number of decisions have admitted statements
in ancient documents without first finding that the author
had personal knowledge of the matters stated or that a sepa-
rate exception to the hearsay rule applied, none of these deci-
sions addressed-let alone mentioned-the rule against mul-
tiple hearsay.2 3  Because none of these decisions have
reached the issue, they cannot be considered meaningfully to
contradict the decisions discussed above that have reached
the issue and concluded that statements in ancient docu-
ments are still subject to the rule against multiple hearsay.
VI. MAKING STATEMENTS IN ANCIENT DOCUMENTS SUBJECT
TO THE RULE AGAINST MULTIPLE HEARSAY IS GOOD POLICY
The foregoing analysis of the text, legislative history, and
common law origins of Rule 803(16) suggests that, in order
for a statement in an ancient document to be admissible to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, the statement must
be within the personal knowledge of the author or otherwise
208. Id. at 1329, 1343.
209. Id. at 1343. Similar reasoning supported the admission of statements
in a newspaper article in Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.,
286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
210. 665 F. Supp. 1472, 1490 (N.D. Ala. 1987).
211. Id. at 1485-86.
212. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
213. See authorities cited supra note 193.
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fall under a separate exception to the hearsay rule. For each
level of hearsay it must be demonstrated that an exception to
the hearsay rule applies. Objections may be raised that such
rule is undesirable, for a number of reasons. Examination of
these anticipated objections, however, demonstrates that the
foregoing rule is good policy.
One objection that may be raised to the application of the
rule against multiple hearsay to ancient documents is that
such a rule is too impractical to apply. Given the require-
ment that a document must be at least twenty years old in
order to qualify as an ancient document under Rule 803(16),
it will likely be difficult to locate the author. There will be no
opportunity to examine the author to ascertain what state-
ments in the document are made on personal knowledge,
which are hearsay, and which are speculation. The party
seeking to introduce the statement into evidence bears the
burden of demonstrating that an exception to the hearsay
rule applies.214 Because of this, it may be argued that it will
be all but impossible to show that any statements in the an-
cient document are admissible to prove the truth of the mat-
ters asserted.
A rebuttal to this objection is that it rests on the false
premise that the requisite personal knowledge on the part of
the author may be demonstrated only by having the author
testify live in court. At least one commentator has asserted
that requiring the party seeking to introduce the document
into evidence to prove firsthand knowledge by providing the
sworn testimony of the author would be unreasonable."5 The
214. See Byrd v. Hunt Tool Shipyards, Inc., 650 F. 2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1981)
(stating that the proponent of evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 803(6)
bears burden of proving circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness); Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 215 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975
(1957) (stating that the party seeking to introduce documents under Rule
803(6) bears burden of proving a systematic or routine procedure being followed
in the preparation and filing of such documents).
215. See STRONG, supra note 12, § 323, at 360 n.15. A similar view was ex-
pressed by Professor Wickes in his article on the ancient document rule under
the common law:
Of course, in the case of such recitals [in ancient documents), as in the
case of other hearsay exceptions, a strict showing as to the exact state
of the declarant's knowledge is impossible, and cannot be rigorously in-
sisted upon. After the lapse of so many years it would be unfair to re-
quire the proponent clearly to prove that the declarant actually knew
from personal observation the facts with respect to which the declara-
tion was made. Such a requirement would be unreasonable, and would
1999]
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Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803 agrees. With respect
to any hearsay declarant (including a document's author), his
"firsthand knowledge" of a hearsay statement may be demon-
strated in either of two ways: "[i]t may appear from his
statement or be inferrable from circumstances."216 Essen-
tially the same approach was adopted by the court in In re
Rhode Island Asbestos Cases.217 After determining that the
rule against multiple hearsay applied to statements in an-
cient documents, the court stated that it:
does not intend, however, to apply a strict requirement of
personal knowledge. That would be impossible consider-
ing the unavailability today of most of the declarants.
Therefore, if the declarant could have been in a position to
know the truth of the facts which he asserts, the state-
ment will be admitted.218
This also appears consistent with the approach taken by the
few other decisions that have expressly addressed the appli-
cability of the rule against double hearsay to statements in
ancient documents.219 As these authorities demonstrate, un-
der this approach it will by no means be impossible to have
statements in ancient documents admitted to prove the truth
of the matters asserted.
Another objection that may be raised to the application
of the rule against multiple hearsay to ancient documents is
that this approach is too rigid. With respect to events that
occurred more than twenty years ago, statements in a docu-
ment contemporaneous to those events will be much more
result in the exclusion of much relevant evidence.
Wickes, supra note 12, at 473.
216. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's notes. See also STRONG, supra
note 12, § 323, at 360. Professor Wickes advocated the same approach with re-
spect to the ancient document rule under the common law: "All that can be
practically required is that it appear from the circumstances that the declarant
could have had personal knowledge of the matters recited. Where it clearly ap-
pears that the declarant could have no personal knowledge about such matters,
the recital should be, and usually has been, excluded." Wickes, supra note 12,
at 473.
217. 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (CBC) 444, 448 (D.R.I. July 7, 1982).
218. Id. at 448 (citing 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 803(16)[01], at 803-244
(1981)).
219. See United States v. Hajda, 135 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Stelmokas, No. 92-3440, 1995 WL 464264 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 1995); Estate of
Cole v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 715 (T.C. Nov. 20, 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 963 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1992).
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reliable than a witness' recollection of those events today.220
It will be argued that this would be the case even where the
author lacked personal knowledge of the matters stated and
the statements failed to fit within the neat exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Mechanical application of the rule against
multiple hearsay to statements in ancient documents would
result in relevant evidence being excluded. In many of these
cases, this might be the only evidence available on the subject
at all.221 Some evidence, even if it contains nominally inad-
missible hearsay, is better than no evidence at all.
This argument, however, overlooks the inherent flexibil-
ity of the hearsay rules. Exceptions to the hearsay rule do
not consist only of a series of narrowly defined and rigid
categories. The residual exception to the rule against hear-
say, Rule 807, allows hearsay statements to be admitted to
prove the truth of the matter asserted where no other hear-
say exception applies, but the statement has circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness.222 Where a document admis-
sible as an ancient document contains multiple hearsay
statements, Rule 807 is available to have those statements
admitted. This rule has been applied in conjunction with
other exceptions to the hearsay rule to admit statements that
would otherwise be excluded as multiple hearsay.22 Through
Rule 807, the potential harshness of the application of the
rule against multiple hearsay to statements in ancient docu-
220. See Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388,
396 (5th Cir. 1961) ("[It seems impossible that the testimony of any witness [to
events occurring more than 50 years ago] would have been as accurate and as
reliable as the statement of facts in the contemporary newspaper article.").
221. Cf. Wickes, supra note 12, at 475 ("That such [hearsay] evidence is often
unreliable may be conceded .... But it does not follow from this that, where
the only light that can be thrown upon a relevant fact of a case on trial is the
faint and unsatisfactory light of a hearsay declaration, the proper remedy is to
cut off that light entirely.").
222. Federal Rule of Evidence 807 provides, in relevant part:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not ex-
cluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the state-
ment is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evi-
dence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 807.
223. Herdman v. Smith, 707 F.2d 839, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1983).
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ments is tempered. This will give litigants and courts some
flexibility in applying the rule against multiple hearsay to
statements within ancient documents.
VII. CONCLUSION
The rule against multiple hearsay should apply to state-
ments in ancient documents. While the language of the an-
cient document rule is ambiguous on this point, this conclu-
sion is driven by the legislative history of Rule 803(16) and
the treatment of multiple hearsay in ancient documents un-
der the common law. In order for a statement in an ancient
document to be admissible to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, the party seeking to have the statement admitted
must demonstrate that the statement is either: (1) within the
personal knowledge of the author; or (2) falls under a sepa-
rate exception to the hearsay rule. For each level of hearsay
within the ancient document, the proponent of the admission
of the statement must demonstrate that it falls within an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. This conclusion is confirmed by
the few cases that have addressed the issue expressly, and is
also supported as good policy.
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